This study investigates the wealth impact for Japanese and U.S. firms that announce non-equity strategic alliances. We find that, on average, both Japanese and U.S. shareholders benefit from the formation of international alliances. We also show that shareholder gains in these alliances are significantly larger for the partnering firms with a relatively small size, higher growth opportunities, or less profitability. Finally, we document that both Japanese and U.S. partnering firms display significant improvements in operating performance over the three-year period subsequent to the formation of international alliances. 
I. Introduction
With the integration of global markets and rapid shifts in technologies, the formation of cross-border inter-firm cooperation has become a favored strategy of international expansion. Alliance with foreign partners is an important strategic move that could provide access to outside sources of competitive advantage in the global network (Kogut, 1983; Lummer and McConnell, 1990; and others) . For example, the Wall Street Journal (August 25, 1998) While alliances with foreign partners take various forms, the primary focus of previous research has been on the stock valuation impact of announced international joint ventures that establish separate entities under shared ownership.
1 Nevertheless, there are a significant number of international strategic alliances (ISAs) that do not involve equity ownership, in which the partnering firms neither share equity control nor create a new organizational identity, but simply agree to pool resources. Such non-equity arrangements, in fact, account for more than 50% of all collaborative arrangements across industries (Zagnoli, 1987; and Chan et al., 1997) . In addition, non-equity ISAs provide more organizational flexibility to the partnering firms than international joint ventures (Mody, 1993) . Non-equity ISAs can form new links with partner firms or disband quickly in response to changing market demands. This flexible structure facilitates experimentation with new combinations of participants in the pursuit of new products, technologies or markets. Therefore, non-equity ISAs are particularly valuable to those firms that compete in environments characterized by rapid rates of change in product design and process technologies, with significant risks of failure at the development stage, and rapid obsolescence of products once they enter production (Chan et al., 1997) .
Our objective is to examine the wealth effect of non-equity ISAs on the shareholders of the partnering firms. In addition, we investigate the importance of differences in the characteristics of firms and alliances in determining the valuation consequences across firms. We examine a sample of non-equity ISAs between Japanese firms and U.S. firms over the 1989-1998 period. Focusing on Japanese-U.S. strategic alliances enables us to investigate the wealth gains for both domestic partners and foreign partners. This also allows us to examine the determinants of value creation without confounding influences from various business environments when ISA partners come from different countries.
2
Our study is different from Chan et al. (1997) , Das et al. (1998) , and Allen and Phillips (2000) . They investigated the wealth effect of domestic strategic alliances (DSAs) and found mixed results. Chan et al. (1997) and Allen and Phillips (2000) found that participant firms experience significantly positive abnormal returns associated with announcements of non-equity DSAs, but Das et al. (1998) found no evidence of significant valuation effects for such DSAs. In contrast, we focus on the wealth effect for Japanese and U.S. firms that announce non-equity strategic alliances across the Japan-U.S. border.
While ISAs can have value for reasons common to DSAs, they may produce additional benefits because they cross national borders. In addition, ISAs are typically used as a means to implement international expansion and diversification strategies, whereas DSAs focus more on restricting intra-industry competition (Glaister and Buckley, 1999) .
Our results indicate that shareholders of U.S. partners realize significant gains when their strategic alliances with Japanese firms are announced. Shareholders of Japanese firms also experience gains from such ISAs. Our evidence suggests that ISAs produce a positive wealth impact for the combined partnering firms without wealth transfers between partners. We also find that shareholder gains in the Japanese-U.S.
alliances are significantly larger for the partnering firms with a relatively small size, higher growth opportunities, or less profitability. Finally, we show that both Japanese and U.S.
partnering firms exhibit significant improvements in their operating performance subsequent to the alliances. This result contrasts with the finding in Chan et al. (1997) that partnering firms do not experience significant changes in operating performance following domestic strategic alliances.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II elaborates on the advantages and disadvantages of non-equity ISAs and develops the hypotheses on the potentially important determinants of their wealth effect. Section III describes our sample selection and methodology. Section IV examines the stock price response to announcements of Japanese-U.S. strategic alliances. Section V reports operating performance for the partnering firms in the alliances. The final section concludes.
II. The Economic Consequences of ISAs
In this section, we first elaborate on the benefits and costs associated with non-equity ISAs. We then investigate the factors that could explain the variation of their valuation impact.
A. The Benefits and Costs Associated with ISAs
Cross-border inter-firm collaboration offers several benefits to the partnering firms.
Many global alliances are motivated by the recognition that self-sufficiency is too slow and costly to bring success in an intensively competitive global market (Inkpen, 1995) . With help from foreign partners, ISAs may enable firms to explore new market opportunities, reduce investment risks, or establish distribution channels more efficiently and effectively.
These advantages are particularly critical for firms with limited resources and for those that compete in an attractive, but unfamiliar, market (Harrigan, 1987) . In this respect, ISAs serve as an important move that facilitates international expansion strategy.
Another benefit of ISAs to the partnering firms is based on the arguments from transaction costs economics (Williamsom, 1989) . The proponents of the transaction costs approach emphasize that, because neither partner has to bear the full risk and costs of the alliance activities, the hybrid organizational form of ISAs involves mutual commitment not commonly found in market transactions and simultaneously reduces the uncertainty and costs of resources investment associated with full-scale internalization. With a proper design of governance structure, ISAs are beneficial in reducing costs associated with negotiating, implementing, and monitoring cross-border inter-firm transactions.
ISAs also enable the partnering firms to obtain resources that enhance firms' competitive advantages (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996) . Resources-based view focuses on creating bundles of recourses that serve as a source of competitive advantages and, in turn, superior performance. This suggests that ISAs generate competitive advantages and improve performance beyond firms' domain by providing access to strategic resources in physical capital, distribution channels, manufacturing facilities, and others, from their partners. These strategic resources are usually scarce and imperfectly imitable, and lack of direct substitutes. In addition, firms may even get access to further resources beyond the boundary of their alliance partners. Through alliances with foreign partners, firms could enhance social resources by achieving an important position advantage in the global network.
From the perspective of organizational learning, ISAs also allow firms to focus on their own core competence and, at the same time, learn to enhance other capacities from collaborating with partnering firms. Particularly, through the platform of ISAs, firms may learn tacit experimental skills and knowledge embedded in their foreign partners that are crucial for remaining competitive in the rapidly changing global markets (Porter and Fuller, 1986) . The knowledge can be useful in strengthening the strategic, operational, and tactical aspects of businesses. Furthermore, ISAs may improve firms' competitive position through the channel of learning country-specific comparative advantages from their foreign partners (Shan and Hamilton, 1991) .
Despite the above advantages, ISAs are often plagued by interest conflicts between partnering firms. Alliances are essentially incomplete contracts because ex ante it is often impossible to completely specify the future contingencies that may arise in the implementation of the agreements. The contractual incompleteness leads to the possibility that firms expose themselves to the opportunistic exploitation by the partnering firms that may break-off or change the agreements, the well-known hold-up problem usually found in contractual collaborations (Mody, 1993) . In addition, anticipating the potential ex post opportunism in distributing the resulting profits, partnering firms may have less incentive to make investments ex ante, especially in the situation that the assets involved are specific to the alliance ventures. Consequently, the problem of hold-up could significantly reduce the realized synergy from collaboration or result in renegotiations or even termination of strategic alliances (Das et al., 1998; and Allen and Philips, 2000) . This problem can play a more important role in ISAs since collaboration with partners from different countries could create greater barrier of mutual trust and understanding. Furthermore, it is more difficult to specify complete future contingencies in a rapidly changing global market.
B. The Determinants of the Wealth Effect of ISAs

Partner Relative Size
ISAs with larger partnering firms may provide important benefits to small partners.
Large firms often have more abundant resources in capital availability, logistic distribution, product manufacturing, marketing forces, or other organizational competitiveness that are crucial to the long-run success of small firms (Alvarez and Barney, 2001 (Gulati, 1995 ). This will not only enhance their own reputation as a desired partner, but also foreclose competing rivals' partnering opportunities. Therefore, the relative size hypothesis predicts that ISAs add more value to the participating firms that are smaller than their alliance partner.
Growth and Technological Opportunities
One principal motive of ISA formation is to learn about and experiment with technological capabilities and market strategies. The learning process becomes essential as firms face greater difficulties in developing complex technological and organizational competencies (Singh, 1997) . ISAs allow for establishing new connections or disbanding the previous network in response to rapidly changing demand in the market places. Since
ISAs do not involve equity commitment, the organizational flexibility inherent in alliances facilitates experimentation with new combinations of participants in the pursuit of sustainable growth under great uncertainty (Crocker and Masten, 1988; and Mody, 1993) .
The option of experiment would be particularly valuable to rapidly growing firms or firms competing in high-tech environments that are characterized by quick changes in product design and process technologies and by rapid obsolescence of products (Chan et al., 1997) .
Therefore, we expect to find that ISAs involving firms with high growth potential or that operate in high-tech industries contribute more value to the partnering firms than ISAs involving firms with limited growth opportunities or that operate in low-tech industries.
Business Relatedness
The transaction costs theory argues that partners' business overlap is beneficial to ISAs in production and transaction gains because of a common ground for the development of cross-sharing of technology and skills (Chan et al., 1997) . Business similarity may also permit firms to better identify the partners' contributions. When partnering firms are from unrelated businesses, the performance of the ISA may be harmed because differences in management and valuation on the joint activities exacerbate (Harrigan, 1988) . In addition, because business relatedness enables firms to detect and thus prevent the imposition of partners' opportunistic behavior, the potential costs associated with ISAs are reduced. Finally, the closer the partners are, the more effectively would pooling of operations help them exert market power in the product-market space they occupy (Kogut, 1988) .
Cooperating with firms in related businesses, however, can be difficult. ISAs between firms in related businesses blur the distinction between competition and cooperation (Porter and Fuller, 1986) . The potentially conflicting objectives of the competing partners could reduce the intended synergy of collaboration. The tension faced by a partnering firm in attempting to manage both a cooperating strategy and a competing strategy with rivals may become too difficult to reconcile. Park and Russo (1996) suggest that ISAs with competitors tend to be unstable and could easily dissolve or break-up. In fact, many alliances involving rivals may actually spark a learning race and induce competition, rather than cooperation between partnering firms (Baum et al., 2000) .
Furthermore, the motive of ISA formation may depend on the existence of complementary resources in the potential partners. Alliances with partners in unrelated industries are more likely to pool complementary assets than related partners, who would simply duplicate their assets (Mohanram and Nanda, 1996) .
Therefore, considering the above arguments together, the relation between business relatedness and the wealth effect of ISAs would be ambiguous.
Prior Involvement in ISAs
The characteristics of incomplete contracts inherent in ISAs create possibility of partners' exploitation and, in turn, reduce shareholders' wealth. The risk of opportunistic behavior from ISA partners could be reduced as firms accumulate experience in the capability to anticipate the contingencies and respond to them in an effective manner. Cohen and Levinthal (1994) suggest that firms learn to build organizational capabilities from previous experience, and such learning will facilitate new learning and the application of new knowledge. When engaging in similar sets of activities repeatedly, firms improve and refine on those routines. With greater experience from ISAs, managers are more able to internalize and refine skills in managing inter-firm cooperation, as well as enhance their absorptive capacity from the ISAs. Furthermore, the specialized organizational learning from prior experience is not easily imitated and can actually become an important competitive advantage for the firm (Collis, 1996) . Therefore, we expect that ISAs are more valuable for the partnering firms that have a greater level of prior involvement in ISAs.
Profitability
Das et al. (1998) suggest that established, profitable firms are more likely to be the first movers in ISAs. In search for continuing growth, profitable firms usually need the innovative or special capability owned by small firms that do not have the necessary manufacturing or marketing scales. Being the first movers, however, usually results in weaker bargaining power in the process of negotiating alliances, suffering from the hold-up problem (Hamel et al., 1989) . To the extent that the opportunistic behavior impedes the stability of and synergy created from ISAs, profitable firms are likely to suffer from first-mover disadvantages and thus are expected to receive less wealth gains in ISAs.
In addition, profitable firms are likely to commit more resources in inter-firm collaboration.
Because of this, small firms may simply have a greater chance to improve and acquire new resources, while profitable firms may have less to gain. Therefore, wealth gains in ISAs are expected to be smaller for the partnering firms with higher profitability.
The Potential for the Transfer or Pooling of Technological Know-How
Technical ISAs that involve the transfer or pooling of technological knowledge may create more value than nontechnical/marketing ISAs (Chan et al., 1997; and Das et al., 1998) . Technical ISAs represent an effective organization that brings together complementary skills and knowledge needed in high technology industries. This framework of cooperation and exchange is valuable when the subject of exchange is highly specialized, intangible, inimitable, or embedded in organization routines under which market-based trading is costly (Singh, 1997) . The outputs from technical ISAs are likely to have influential effects on innovative activities that are unlikely to be achieved by firms acting alone, such as new product introductions or improvement in product-producing process. In addition, technical ISAs may bring cost advantages for the partnering firms through sharing fixed capital cost of equipments (Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994) .
In contrast, nontechnical/marketing ISAs focus more on stimulating existing market demand, repositioning existing product lines, or entering new markets. Hagedoorn (1993) documents that technical alliances are more prevalent in high-growth sectors, while nontechnical/marketing alliances are more prevalent in mature industries and sectors undergoing consolidation. As a result, firms entering technical ISAs may have products in the early stages of their life cycles and stand to gain more than firms of nontechnical/marketing ISAs with mature products, simply because they have more time to capture future benefits. We thus expect that technical ISAs add more value to the partnering firms than nontechnical/marketing ISAs.
The Partner's Home Currency Strength
The valuation impact of an ISA may be related to the strength of the partnering firm's domestic currency. When imperfections in the flow of goods and services across national borders are present, the ISA may provide a vehicle for taking advantage of cost and revenue differentials induced by changing exchange rates (Doukas and Travlos, 1988; and Crutchley et al., 1991) . If a partnering firm's domestic currency has become relatively strong, gains to its shareholders can arise if finished goods and services are purchased by the foreign alliance partner, or their production is located across the border through an ISA.
In this way, the domestic costs of goods or services on the foreign country experiencing the devalued currency are kept low, while the value of those goods or services increases, because of the increased strength of the home partner's currency. Therefore, the currency strength hypothesis predicts that wealth gains in ISAs are larger when the ISA partner's domestic currency is relatively strong.
III. Sample Selection and Methodology
In this section, we first describe the sample design. We then describe how we measure abnormal stock returns.
A. Sample
An initial sample of Japanese-U.S. strategic alliances is collected from the Securities Data Corporation's (SDC) Worldwide Merges, Acquisitions and Alliances database. We remove those alliances involving equity investments, such as joint ventures and minority equity participation, because our study focuses on non-equity ISAs. We then search for their initial announcement dates in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ). The sample period is from 1989 to 1998.
In order to be included in the final sample, the alliances have to meet the following criteria:
(1) To investigate the wealth gains for both domestic and foreign partners, U.S. and Japanese partnering firms in the same strategic alliance must have daily stock price information available from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) returns files and Datastream, respectively.
(2) To facilitate investigation of the determinants of the wealth effect of ISAs, we restrict our attention to those strategic alliances involving only one U.S. firm and one Japanese firm in the same alliance.
(3) To avoid any confounding events that could distort the measurement of the valuation effects of the alliances, we exclude those announcements by U.S. firms that made other announcements five days before or five days after the initial announcement date. environment. Panel D also shows that the Japanese-U.S. alliances are most prevalent in the 3 The conclusions in this study remain unchanged if firm size is measured by the firm's market value of total assets or sales for the fiscal year prior to the announcement. 4 When the Japanese firm's equity is reported in yen, it is converted into dollars using the exchange rate appropriate to the strategic alliance announcement date.
computer, information technology, and software industries (43.0%), followed by semiconductors and electrical equipment (12.9%). The largest group of low-technology firms comes from the machinery and equipment sector (5.1%), followed by the motor vehicle and auto bodies industry (3.4%).
B. Measuring Abnormal Stock Returns
We employ standard event-study methods to examine stock price responses to announcements of Japanese-U.S. strategic alliances. Day 0 is defined as the initial announcement date. Abnormal return is calculated as the difference between the actual return and an expected return generated by the market model. We use the value weighted CRSP index and the value weighted Nikki 225 Index as proxies for U.S. and Japanese market returns, respectively. We estimate the parameters of the market model using the data over the period from 200 to 60 days before the announcement date.
Abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns are generated for each partnering firm over the period 30 days before to 30 days after the initial announcement date. Cumulative abnormal returns over the periods (-30, -2) , (-20, -2) 
IV. Stock Price Responses to Alliance Announcements
In this section, we first investigate the stock price response for the announcing firms as a whole. We then analyze subsamples stratified according to the characteristics of firms and alliances. Cross-sectional regression analyses are also studied in detail.
A. Overall Sample
Panel A of Table II provides estimates of abnormal returns to shareholders of U.S.
partners around the strategic alliance announcement. We find that the U.S. partner shareholders experience a positive average two-day announcement-period abnormal return of 2%, statistically significant at the 1% level. Their median abnormal return is 0.78%, also statistically significant at the 1% level, and 59% of their sample announcement effects are positive. No significant abnormal returns are observed for the U.S. partners preceding and following the announcement period. Our evidence indicates that, on average, shareholders of U.S. partners in Japanese-U.S. strategic alliances benefit significantly from the ISA undertaking.
[Insert Table II To understand how the stock market values the international strategic alliance as a whole, we combine the abnormal returns of all the U.S. and Japanese partners in the same alliance to form a value-weighted portfolio, using the partner firms' market values of equity as weights. Panel C presents the results for our 178 Japanese-U.S. strategic alliances. The average (median) two-day announcement-period abnormal return is a statistically significant 0.36% (0.14%), and 55% of the announcement effects are positive.
None of the remaining event period abnormal returns are statistically significant.
Therefore, the ISAs in our sample receive significantly positive abnormal returns.
We also calculate the dollar value of gains to the shareholders of partnering firms in Japanese-U.S. strategic alliances. Using the two-day (-1, 0) announcement-period abnormal return and the firms' market value of equity, we find that at 1998 prices, the average dollar gain to U.S. shareholders is US$30.5 million and the average dollar gain to Japanese shareholders is US$41.4 million. The combined dollar gain for a value-weighted portfolio of U.S. and Japanese partners in the same strategic alliance is US$51 million on average. Therefore, we conclude that value is created by the formation of ISAs and that there is no evidence of wealth transfers between the U.S. and Japanese partners to ISAs.
That is, the observed wealth effect in ISAs is due to value creation, not to value appropriation. Table III reports the announcement-period abnormal returns to the partnering firms in the Japanese-U.S. strategic alliances, which we obtain by dividing the sample according to the characteristics of firms and alliances. We collect data on U.S. and Japanese patterning firms' characteristics from Compustat and Datastream, respectively. We also collect data on alliance characteristics from SDC and the WSJ articles. T-tests and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are used to test the hypotheses that the means and medians are equal to zero, respectively. Differences in means between subsamples are assessed using t-tests. To check whether our results are robust to possible deviations from nonnormality, we also perform nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis tests. The number of observations in Table   III varies because of data unavailability.
B. Analysis of Subsamples
[Insert Table III here]
To investigate the relative size hypothesis, we classify the partnering firms in the same alliance as either the large or small partner according to their relative firm size.
Panel A shows that the small partner subsample has a positive average (median)
announcement-period abnormal return of 2.22% (0.99%), statistically significant at the 1% level. In contrast, the large partner subsample experiences an insignificant average (median) abnormal return of 0.21% (-0.01%). The mean difference between the abnormal returns for these two groups of partnering firms is -2.01% and is statistically significant at the 1% level. This result is robust to possible deviations from nonnormality, since it also holds for the nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis test statistic. Our results support the relative size hypothesis that ISAs are more valuable to the participating firms that are smaller than their alliance partner.
Panel B divides the sample by the growth opportunities of the partnering firms in the Japanese-U.S. strategic alliances. We estimate growth opportunities by a simple measure of Tobin's q: the ratio of the market to book value of the firm's assets, where the market value of assets equals the book value of assets minus the book value of common equity plus the market value of common equity. 6 The q variable is the average q for the three fiscal years prior to the announcement. 7 We divide our sample according to whether the partnering firms have a q greater or less than the sample median. High-q firms are those with q above the sample median, while low-q firms are those with q below the sample median. 8 We find that high-q partners experience a significantly positive mean (median)
announcement-period abnormal return of 1.61% (0.67%). Low-q partners also experience a significantly positive mean (median) abnormal return of 0.62% (0.22%). However, the abnormal returns of high-q partners are significantly higher than those of low-q partners.
Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that partnering firms with better growth opportunities receive more wealth gains in ISAs.
Panel C shows comparisons based on whether partnering firms operate in high-or low-technology industries. We find that the announcement-period abnormal return for the high-technology subsample is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.
However, for the low-technology subsample, the abnormal return is not significantly different from zero. Furthermore, the mean difference between the abnormal returns for the high-and low-technology subsamples is statistically significant. Our findings support the theoretical prediction that high-technology partners benefit more from ISAs than low-technology partners.
6 This simple measure of q for investment opportunities has been widely used in previous studies. See, for example, Denis (1994) , Kang and Stulz (1996) , and Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999) . Chung and Pruitt (1994) show that at least 96.6% of the variability of Tobin's q (based on Lindenberg and Ross, 1981 ) is explained by this simple measure of q. 7 This follows the approach used in Lang et al. (1991) and others. A three-year average gives a better estimate of a firm's true q (Lang et al., 1989) . The results are qualitatively similar if the q variable over the last year prior to the announcement is used. 8 Our conclusion remains unchanged when high-q (low-q) firms are those with q above (below) one.
Panel D stratifies the sample according to whether partnering firms in the same Japanese-U.S. strategic alliance are from related businesses. We define related alliances as those between firms in the same four-digit SIC code. 9 We find that partner firms in the related alliances experience an insignificant announcement-period abnormal return, whereas those in the unrelated alliances experience a significantly positive abnormal return. However, the abnormal returns for these two subsamples are not significantly different at the conventional levels. Therefore, there is no strong support for the hypothesis that the wealth effect of ISAs depends on partners' business relatedness, probably because of their ambiguous relationship as described above.
In Panel E, we divide the sample firms by their previous experience in Japanese-U.S. strategic alliances. We define experienced firms as those with at least one Japanese-U.S. strategic alliance preceding their announcement date. 10 We find that both experienced and inexperienced firms exhibit significantly positive announcement-period abnormal returns. The mean difference between the abnormal returns for these two subsamples is statistically significant at the 10% level, based on a t-test. However, this result does not hold for the nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis test statistic. Therefore, our evidence does not provide support for the hypothesis that ISAs add more value for experienced partnering firms.
Panel F divides the partnering firms in Japanese-U.S. alliances into high-and low-profitability groups. We measure profitability by the ratio of net income to book value of assets (NI/assets) for the fiscal year prior to the announcement. 11 High-profitability firms are those with the profitability ratio above the sample median, and low-profitability firms are those with the profitability ratio below the sample median. We find that both high-and low-profitability firms experience significantly positive announcement-period abnormal returns. Furthermore, the abnormal returns are significantly higher for low-profitability firms than for high-profitability firms. Our findings support the hypothesis that wealth gains in ISAs are smaller for the partnering firms with higher profitability.
Panel G shows comparisons based on whether the Japanese-U.S. strategic alliance is technical or nontechnical. Following Chan et al. (1997) and Das et al. (1998) To test the currency strength hypothesis, we first rank the ¥/$ (yen/dollar) exchange rate of the month of each Japanese-U.S. alliance announcement from lowest to highest and divide into two equal groups: ¥/$ high and ¥/$ low. We then classify announcement-period abnormal returns to shareholders of alliance partners according to whether their home currency is relatively strong. Panel H shows that the abnormal returns for partners with strong home currency are not significantly different from those with weak home currency.
Our results fail to support the hypothesis that shareholder gains in ISAs are larger when the partner's domestic currency is relatively strong.
C. Cross-Sectional Regression Analyses
Although the univariate results in Table III support the notion that announcements of Japanese-U.S. strategic alliances have significant valuation effects influenced by various characteristics, the tests do not capture the possible interaction among the characteristics we examine. A multivariate analysis incorporates the interaction between these variables and captures the overall effect of the distinguishable characteristics that affect the wealth effect of the alliances. To further examine the effect of these factors, we estimate a multivariate cross-sectional regression of the announcement-period abnormal returns to the partnering firms in the Japanese-U.S. alliances. We estimate the regression using weighted least squares, with the weights equal to the inverse of the standard deviation of the market-model residual. This procedure is used to obtain efficient estimates since the variances of the market-model residuals vary across announcers (Lang et al., 1991; and others) . We present the results of the regression in Table IV The organizational flexibility inherent in non-equity ISAs facilitates experimentation with new combinations of participants in the pursuit of sustainable growth under great uncertainty. The ability to experiment is particularly valuable to rapidly growing firms.
Therefore, partnering firms with high growth potential receive more wealth gains in ISAs than those with limited growth opportunities.
Consistent with our earlier result in Table III, Table IV shows that the partnering firm's share price responses are significantly negatively related to its return on assets.
More profitable firms are likely to be the first movers in ISAs because they search aggressively for innovative, less profitably alliance partners. The more profitable partner in an ISA is thus likely to suffer a first mover disadvantage due to the hold-up problem.
Therefore, wealth gains in ISAs are smaller for the partnering firms with higher profitability. Table IV shows that the partnering firm's share price responses are not significantly affected by the high-tech industry dummy, the business relatedness dummy, the previous experience variable, the technical-alliance dummy, and the currency strength dummy. The results suggest that these factors are relatively unimportant in assessing the valuation effects of Japanese-U.S. strategic alliances.
V. Operating Performance for Partners Subsequent to Alliances
Operating performance of alliance partners surrounding announcements provide additional evidence on the economic impact of ISAs. Following Jain and Kini (1994), Chan et al. (1997) , Loughran and Ritter (1997) , and others, we measure the operating performance of each partnering firm in the Japanese-U.S. strategic alliance using the following three measures: (1) operating return on assets, which equals operating income before depreciation, depletion, and amortization as a percentage of total assets (OIBD/assets); (2) operating cash flows deflated by total assets (OCF/assets), where operating cash flows are defined as operating income less capital expenditures; and (3) return on assets, which is NI/assets. 14 The data are from Compustat and Datastream.
We examine the operating performance of the partnering firm in the alliance announcement year (year 0) and over the three-year period following the announcement year (years +1 to +3). We also compare the partnering firm's performance variables in year 0 with those in years +1 to +3, to measure the change in its operating performance following the alliance. To control for industry effects, we adjust the change in the performance variables by subtracting from the partnering firm's change the median change over the same period for all firms with the same four-digit primary SIC code.
Table V presents the changes in operating performance of partnering firms 14 All results are replicated by deflating the three measures of operating performance by net sales rather than total assets. The results are qualitatively similar.
following Japanese-U.S. strategic alliances. T-tests and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are used to test the hypotheses that the means and medians are equal to zero, respectively. The number of observations varies because of data unavailability.
[Insert Table V here]
In year 0, U.S. partners perform better than their industry counterparts, according to the mean and median industry-adjusted ratios of OIBD/assets, OCF/assets, and NI/assets.
Japanese partners also show better performance than their industry in the year of the ISA formation. Our findings suggest that firms that enter into ISAs tend to outperform their industry counterparts.
U.S. partners in the sample experience significant improvements in operating performance after a strategic alliance with Japanese firms. All measures of mean and median changes in operating performance between year 0 and years +1, +2, and +3 are positive and mostly statistically significant at the 10% level of better. Results are similar for industry-adjusted figures. Japanese partners also show a similar trend of an improving operating performance subsequent to the alliance. The post-alliance operating performance results are consistent with the return performance results in Table II: value is created by the formation of ISAs and there are no wealth transfers between the partnering firms to ISAs. Our evidence is in contrast to Chan et al. (1997) , who find that partnering firms do not experience significant changes in operating performance following a domestic strategic alliance.
VI. Conclusion
This study provides the first evidence on the wealth effect of international strategic alliances that do not involve equity ownership, by examining a sample of Japanese-U.S.
alliances. We show that, on average, both Japanese and U.S. shareholders benefit from the formation of international alliances. Our evidence suggests that international strategic alliances produce a positive wealth effect for the combined partnering firms without evidence of wealth transfers between partners. We also relate the partnering firms' share price responses to the characteristics of firms and alliances. A multivariate cross-sectional regression analysis shows that three factors are statistically significant in explaining the abnormal returns: partner relative size, growth opportunities, and profitability. The partnering firms' share price responses are significantly negatively related to their relative firm size and profitability, and are significantly positively related to their growth opportunities. Finally, we examine the operating performance for partnering firms surrounding announcements of Japanese-U.S strategic alliances. We document that both Japanese and U.S. partnering firms display significant improvements in operating performance over the three-year period following the formation of international alliances. 
S. Strategic Alliances Grouped by Various Characteristics
This table presents the announcement-period abnormal returns to partnering firms in the Japanese-U.S. strategic alliances, which we obtain by dividing the sample according to the characteristics of firms and alliances. We classify the partnering firms in the same alliance as either the large or small partner according to their market value of equity for the year preceding the announcement. We measure q by the average ratio of the market to book value of the firm's assets for three years preceding the announcement, where the market value of assets equals the book value of assets minus the book value of common equity plus the market value of common equity. High-q firms are those with q above the sample median. High-technology versus low-technology industry classifications are based on SIC codes and Business Week's classification scheme. Related alliances are those between firms in the same four-digit SIC code. Experienced firms are those with at least one Japanese-U.S. strategic alliance preceding their announcement date. We measure profitability by the ratio of net income to assets for the fiscal year prior to the announcement. High profitability firms are those with the profitability ratio above the sample median. Technical alliances include licensing agreements, research or development agreements, technology transfer or systems integration agreements, and combinations involving one or more of the above types of agreements, whereas nontechnical alliances consist of marketing and distribution agreements. We first rank the ¥/$ exchange rate of the month of each Japanese-U.S. alliance announcement from lowest to highest and divide into two equal groups: ¥/$ high and ¥/$ low. We then classify announcement-period abnormal returns to shareholders of alliance partners according to whether their home currency is relatively strong. For each cell, we report the mean abnormal return, the median abnormal return, and, in parentheses, the t-statistic, the p-value for the Wilcoxon z-statistic, and the number of observations. For the comparison of means, we report mean difference, the t-statistic in parentheses assuming unequal variances, and the p-value for the nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis statistic in square brackets. The results are similar with the assumption of equal variances. The number of observations varies because of data unavailability. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. This table presents cross-sectional regression analyses of announcement-period abnormal returns to partnering firms in the Japanese-U.S. strategic alliances. The relative size dummy equals one for partners with a relatively large firm size, and zero otherwise. We use a simple measure of Tobin's q to estimate the announcing firm's growth opportunities: the average ratio of the market to book value of the firm's assets for three years preceding the announcement, where the market value of assets equals the book value of assets minus the book value of common equity plus the market value of common equity. The high-tech industry dummy equals one for partners that operate in high-technology industries, and zero otherwise. The business relatedness dummy equals one if all the partners in the same alliance have the same four-digit SIC code, and zero otherwise. Previous experience is measured by the number of Japanese-U.S. strategic alliances preceding the announcement. Profitability is measured by the ratio of net income to assets for the fiscal year prior to the announcement. The technical-alliance dummy equals one if alliances include licensing agreements, research or development agreements, technology transfer or systems integration agreements, and combinations involving one or more of the above types of agreements, and zero otherwise. The currency strength dummy equals one when the partner's domestic currency is relatively strong, and zero otherwise. All regressions in the table are estimated using weighted least squares, with the weights equal to the reciprocal of the standard deviation of the market model residual. T-statistics are in parentheses. The number of observations varies across regressions because of data unavailability. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.
Model
Variable
(1) (2) This table presents the mean and median changes in operating performance of partnering firms following announcements of Japanese-U.S. strategic alliances. The operating performance measures are: (1) operating return on assets, which equals operating income before depreciation, depletion, and amortization as a percentage of total assets; (2) operating cash flows deflated by total assets, where operating cash flows are defined as operating income less capital expenditures; and (3) return on assets, which is net income divided by assets. T-tests and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are used to test the hypotheses that the means and medians are equal to zero. The number of observations varies because of data unavailability. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. a Difference between the announcing firm's performance ratio and the industry's median ratio in year 0, where the industry's median ratio is calculated for all firms with the same four-digit primary SIC code. Year 0 is the fiscal year in which the alliance is announced. b Change in the announcing firm's performance ratio between year 0 and year t. c Difference between the change in the announcing firm's performance ratio from year 0 to year t and the median change in its industry.
